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Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) has the 
laudable aim of improving the quality of Australian 
research. Its approach is straightforward: measure the 
quality and quantity of research in different fields, with 
the prospect of funding attached to good outcomes, 
and this will stimulate better outcomes. However, this 
approach has many adverse consequences. 
Misleading journal rankings 
In the first ERA round, assessments of the quality of 
research teams were based, in part, on the quality of 
articles published in journals, assumed to correlate 
with the journal rankings of A*, A, B or C. On 30 May 
2011, Senator Kim Carr announced that these rankings 
would be dropped and replaced by ‘journal quality 
profiles.’ How ERA panels will use these profiles is not 
clear. In any case, it is worth reviewing shortcomings 
of journal rankings.
On the surface, it seems sensible to judge the quality 
of research by the journals it is published in. However, 
trouble arises in the steps between journal rankings 
and the quality of research. 
The first step is to establish a ranking for each jour-
nal, with expert panels relying on input from people 
in relevant disciplines. Inevitably, subjective factors 
are involved. For example, panel members might be 
inclined to rank highly a journal in which they had 
published and not so favourably inclined towards an 
unfamiliar journal. 
Then there is the assumption of a unitary ranking of 
a journal. Many journals are less than regular in their 
treatment of submissions, due to invited articles (some-
times published without refereeing), guest editors and 
special issues filled with papers from conferences.
The reputation of a journal often depends on its 
impact on the field, which in turn is due to a small 
number of articles that are widely known and cited. 
Other articles in the journal may be unexceptional. 
Another problem is that impact factors can be manipu-
lated (Arnold and Fowler 2011).
Even if journal rankings were accurate, this doesn’t 
translate into accurate quality ratings of articles, 
because journal standards only set minimums. An arti-
cle’s quality does not go down just because it is sub-
mitted to a C or unranked journal rather than an A* 
journal. Judging quality by where an article appears is 
like judging a person’s wealth by their address. Moving 
to a lower-status suburb doesn’t reduce one’s income.
Simon Cooper and Anna Poletti (2011) argue that 
ERA’s journal-ranking process actually undermined the 
production of high quality research, by discouraging col-
legiality and international networking and by not recog-
nising the way academics access materials digitally.
Many academics saw journal rankings as the most 
objectionable feature of ERA. Although dropping the 
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Excellence in Research for Australia has a number of limitations: inputs are counted as outputs, time is wasted, disciplinary research is 
favoured and public engagement is discouraged. Most importantly, by focusing on measurement and emphasising competition, ERA may 
actually undermine the cooperation and intrinsic motivation that underpin research performance. 
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rankings may give the impression that the rest of ERA 
is acceptable, there are plenty of other problems, some 
of them just as serious.
Inputs counted as outputs
In Australia, grant successes seem to be treated as a 
measure of research success more than most other 
countries (Allen 2010). Peer review of grant appli-
cations is one measure of quality, but grant monies 
themselves are inputs to research, not outputs. ERA 
continues the emphasis on grants.
An alternative would be to look at output/input 
ratios. Imagine a scholar who spends one-third of their 
time on research, valued at $30,000. A scholar who has 
a $30,000 grant then should be expected to produce 
twice the outputs, or much higher quality outputs. But 
this is not how the game is played. Big grants are seen as 
more prestigious, even when there are no more outputs.
Time wasted
Preparing and assessing ERA submissions is time-inten-
sive. It involves many of each university’s most productive 
researchers who are diverted into ERA administration 
rather than doing more of their own work.
Disciplines dominant
ERA categories are built primarily around disciplines. 
Interdisciplinary researchers often publish in a range of 
journals. Their outputs are spread over several different 
research codes, thus weakening a university’s claim to 
have concentrations of excellent research. The result is 
that more narrowly specialised research is encouraged 
at the expense of cross-disciplinary innovation.
Many of today’s most pressing issues cut across tra-
ditional academic boundaries. By sending a signal that 
interdisciplinary research is less valued, ERA encour-
ages a retreat from engaging with real-world problems.
Misleading narratives  
ERA rewards the existence of groups of researchers in 
nominated fields. This provides an incentive to create, 
on paper, artificial groupings of researchers whose 
outputs collectively seem significant. Then, to fit ERA 
expectations, a narrative needs to be composed about 
how the research of these groupings fits together in a 
coherent package. Many of these narratives are largely 
fiction, especially in fields like the humanities where 
researchers seldom work in teams.
The narratives serve the interests of the ARC. Groups 
are expected to show high-quality outputs from ARC 
grants, so outputs are attributed to grant support even 
when they might have happened anyway. Researchers 
without grants are downgraded. The result is a self-
fulfilling process: in essence, the ARC sets the expecta-
tions for ERA reporting that shows how wonderfully 
effective ARC funding is for research. 
Many researchers give misleading pictures of their 
own research — on their CVs and grant applications — 
for example by claiming more credit for their work than 
deserved. ERA institutionalises incentives to create mis-
leading narratives about research groups and concentra-
tions. Creative research managers might be tempted to 
deceptively reclassify outputs, for example by dumping 
articles in lower-status journals into a ‘reject’ category in 
order to boost rankings in other categories.
Peers, not the public
Because the benchmark for research quality is what 
impresses other researchers, there is an incentive to 
be more inward-looking. By default, applied research 
and public engagement are discouraged (Brett 2011; 
Shergold 2011).
Public engagement — including writing articles for 
newspapers, blogs and other online forums — requires 
a different style than the usual academic journal. Value 
is placed on accessibility and relevance. Jargon is to be 
avoided. Public engagement is a vital contribution to 
society, but is given little or no credit in ERA.
Similarly, applied research useful to outside groups 
— government, industry or community — receives 
less kudos than research pitched to peers. ERA gives 
no formal attention to social impact, which might 
favour applied research. 
Susceptibility to misuse
ERA is supposed to be used to measure the perform-
ance of institutions and research groups, not individ-
uals. However, it did not take long before university 
managers began enforcing ERA-related measures on 
individual academics, for example by rewarding those 
who published in A and A* journals or brought in 
research grants. Academics are at risk of missing out 
on appointments or promotions, or even losing their 
jobs, if their performance falls short in ERA measures, 
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no matter how outstanding they might be otherwise. 
The psychological effect on those whose outputs are 
deemed irrelevant to ERA performance can be severe. 
ERA may inspire better work by some but at the cost 
of demoralisation of many others.
University managers could be blamed for inap-
propriate use of ERA measures. On the other hand, 
the conception of ERA itself is part of the problem, 
because it is so susceptible to abuse.
Competition
The ERA system is competitive, with every university 
and research unit trying to do better than others. How-
ever, no one has presented evidence that competition is 
the most effective way of boosting research quality and 
output. Alfie Kohn (1986) in his classic book No Contest 
found competition is the 
guiding philosophy in edu-
cation and work despite a 
lack of supporting evidence. 
Competition stimulates 
some undesirable behav-
iours. Universities, in their 
race for status, put consider-
able effort into bidding for 
top performers, yet this does not increase overall output 
in the system. In a highly competitive system, research-
ers are more likely to hide or disguise their ideas to pre-
vent others from obtaining an advantage. Universities 
emphasise protecting intellectual property rather than 
contributing to the public domain, even though few uni-
versities make much money from intellectual property. 
Competition puts an enormous strain on researchers 
and can lead to excessive and damaging work practices, 
a type of self-exploitation (Redden 2008).
The alternative is cooperation, well known to be a 
stimulus for research in collaborations and research 
teams. Cooperation in producing software has gener-
ated some of the highest quality products in the world, 
such as the Linux operating system. Online tools now 
enable easy collaboration across continents. MIT has put 
its course materials on the web, leading a move towards 
sharing rather than hoarding intellectual outputs.
Measurement not improvement
The massive effort involved in ERA ends up with 
assessments of research excellence. That is all very 
well, but does measurement actually improve either 
the quality or quantity of research? There is no evi-
dence that it does.
The effort and attention given to ERA might be 
better spent on programmes directly designed to 
improve research. Collectively, the Australian academic 
community has immense knowledge and experience 
concerning research. Sharing this knowledge and 
experience could be promoted through training and 
mentoring schemes. 
Research suggests that the key attribute of success-
ful researchers is persistence, not intelligence (Her-
manowicz 2006). Stories of continued effort despite 
failure would provide motivation for junior research-
ers. However, senior researchers seldom tell the full 
story of their struggles — including rejections of their 
work — as this might detract from their lustre (Hall 
2002). In a more cooperative, supportive research 
environment, such lessons 
would be easier to provide.
Most experienced 
researchers are driven by 
intrinsic motivation, includ-
ing intellectual challenge, 
fascination in developing 
new understandings, and 
satisfaction in working on 
something worthwhile. Intrinsic motivation can be 
undermined by offering external sticks and carrots, 
which is exactly what ERA does. Too many rules and 
external incentives can be counterproductive. Barry 
Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe in their book Practical 
Wisdom describe how this can happen in law, educa-
tion and medicine. They say ‘Rules are set up to estab-
lish and maintain high standards of performance, and to 
allow the lessons learned by some to be shared by all. 
But if they are too strict or too detailed or too numerous, 
they can be immobilizing, counterproductive, and even 
destructive.’ (Schwartz and Sharpe 2010: 255). 
Schwartz and Sharpe (2010) say that people need 
opportunities to exercise discretion, balancing rules 
and circumstances to wisely help achieve the goals of 
the activity. Arguably, one of the reasons for the vocal 
opposition to journal rankings was that they removed 
discretion from academics for deciding where best to 
publish their research. Although journal rankings have 
been dropped, the basic incentive system remains. It 
would be paradoxical if ERA’s apparatus for measuring 
output and providing incentives for particular types of 
output actually sabotaged the very thing it is supposed 
to improve. 
Competition stimulates some undesirable 
behaviours. Universities, in their race for 
status, put considerable effort into bidding 
for top performers, yet this does not 
increase overall output in the system.
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What to do?
Some academics have accepted ERA as a fact of life and 
seek to comply with directives of university managers, 
for example to submit papers only to the most prestig-
ious journals. Others, though, think ERA is so flawed 
that they must resist, either individually or collectively.
One option is to carry on with research as before, 
ignoring ERA imperatives, for example submitting 
papers to the most appropriate journals, whatever 
their academic status. This option is easiest for those 
who have opted out of the struggle for promotions 
and status through the research game, or who are 
senior enough so there is no need to impress others. 
Another option is to refuse to participate in ERA 
exercises, for example declining to lead panels, do 
peer assessments or contribute statements and publi-
cation lists to ERA panel leaders. These forms of indi-
vidual resistance make a statement but have limited 
impact unless they become widespread.
A different sort of response is voicing dissent against 
ERA. This includes careful deconstructions showing its 
damaging effects and vocal complaints to anyone who 
will listen, including letters and articles in newspapers 
and blogs. Academics know a lot of people from dif-
ferent walks of life, which means that informal com-
plaints to friends and critiques in professional forums 
will filter through to politicians and other decision-
makers. As well as rigorous critiques, criticism of ERA 
can take the form of humour: creativity is needed to 
generate the most powerful forms of satire. (I wrote 
this paragraph before journal rankings were dropped 
from ERA, a change directly reflecting the power of 
complaint).
Another response is to set up alternative systems 
for promoting research and assessing performance, 
systems that address ERA’s shortcomings. This is a big 
challenge but definitely worth the effort. Critique is all 
very well, but critics need an answer to the question ‘If 
not ERA, then what?’ 
Conclusion
Some of ERA’s limitations are matters of design, for 
example counting grants as outputs rather than inputs. 
Others are matters of orientation, notably the empha-
sis on disciplinary research. Yet others are deeper: 
ERA assumes that competition and measurement are 
worthwhile, though both are questionable.
ERA is all about promoting research, but curiously 
enough there is little research available to justify the 
approaches adopted by ERA itself. It is not evidence-
based; indeed, there seems to have been no systematic 
comparison with alternatives. Rather than the govern-
ment imposing a competitive measurement scheme, 
a different approach would be to open up space for 
diverse proposals to improve research. 
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